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Abstract
The identities of packet senders and receivers are treated as important privacy
information in communication networks. Any packet can be attributed to its
sender for evaluating its credibility. Existing studies mainly rely on third-party
agents that contain the packet sender’s identity to ensure the sender’s privacy
preservation and credibility. In this case, packet senders run the risk that their
privacy might be leaked by the agent. To this end, this paper proposes a Privacy
Preserved and Credible Network Protocol (PCNP), which authorizes the agent
to hide the identities of senders and receivers, while guaranteeing the credibil-
ity of a packet. The feasibility of the PCNP deployment is analyzed, and its
performance is evaluated through extensive experiments.
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1. Introduction
The research on privacy protection and credibility has made significant
progress in the areas such as Internet-of-Things(IoT) [1, 2, 3, 4], battery ve-
hicles [5, 6], big data [2, 7], Blockchain [8], etc., but it has been relatively
slow for the whole Internet. The current Internet architecture lacks security5
considerations in its initial design. With the rapid development of computer
and communication technologies, the Internet becomes more complex, and its
security is severely challenged. The pervasive use of the Internet has caused
an incredible growth of unwanted traffic, such as spam, malware and malicious
intrusions [9]. The Cybercrimes are constantly growing, and the global Cyberse-10
curity market is expected to skyrocket to $231.94 billion by 2022 [10]. In terms
of security, the packet owner (e.g., packet sender) always wants to show its cred-
ibility while keeping its privacy (i.e., the identity of packet sender) preserved
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: gejingguo@iie.ac.cn (Jingguo Ge), y.l.wu@exeter.ac.uk (Yulei Wu)
Preprint submitted to Journal of LATEX Templates September 17, 2019
[11]. For example, in a typical client-server (C/S) communication scenario, the
server endeavors to have its identity hidden to avoid being attacked, while pro-15
viding a credible service; on the other hand, the client expects to make the
server trust its service request, without showing its identity. However, it is a
great challenge for a sender and/or a receiver to be credible while keeping its
privacy preserved.
Privacy Preservation refers to the situation that no one else except the20
sender itself knows its identity [12, 13, 14], when a packet is issued out; no
one else except the receiver itself knows its identity [15, 16], when a packet is
received; and no one can learn the payload except for the sender and the receiver
[15]. All three types of network layer privacy data have been proposed in [17].
The packet sender and receiver are threatened with privacy leak due to the risks25
such as malicious network monitoring or attack.
Credibility indicates the authenticity and accountability of packet senders
[18]. It is worth noting that it is different from the credibility of web page links
[19]. In other words, the packet sender holds the responsibility for ensuring the
accountability of the packet it provides. Anyone receiving the packet can verify30
its authenticity by challenging its source (i.e., packet sender) [20].
Existing researches mainly focus on either the privacy preservation or the
credibility guarantee of packet senders, typically offering one by sacrificing the
other. Recent studies, e.g., Accountable and Private Internet Protocol (APIP)35
[21] and Accountable and Private Network Architecture (APNA) [22], are to
find a balance by making a tradeoff between these two factors. However, they
focused on using third-party agents to ensure the privacy preservation and the
credibility guarantee for packet senders, where the sender’s identity must be
acquired by the agent. Under this circumstance, the packet senders run the risk40
that their privacy might be leaked by the agent.
To overcome this important problem, this paper proposes a Privacy Pre-
served and Credible Network Protocol (PCNP). The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• A Communication and Verification Agent (CVA) is proposed to ensure the45
privacy preservation of packet senders and receivers. Instead of using the
sender’s and receiver’s identities in packet’s source and destination fields,
the CVA’s identities are used. The packet transmission between senders
and receivers thus looks like being forwarded between their associated
CVAs.50
• Considering the risk of privacy leak by the CVA, a temporary anonymous
identity, AmID, is proposed. AmIDs are published to CVA for hiding
sender’s and receiver’s identities, while CVA knows nothing about the
owner of AmID. In other words, the sender can anonymously authorize
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the CVA to guarantee the credibility of a packet issued by it, without the55
risk of leaking its identity.
• New credibility metrics are proposed to measure the degree of the sender’s
credibility. The victim determines the blocking time of malicious traffic
according to the credibility metrics.
• The deployment and security considerations of the proposed PCNP is dis-60
cussed. Its performance is evaluated through extensive experiments. The
results demonstrate the feasibility and merits of the proposed protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
adversary models for privacy preservation and credibility. Section 3 gives an
overview of the proposed PCNP. The detailed design is discussed in Section 4.65
Section 5 analyzes its potential security issues. Section 6 presents the compat-
ibility and deployment considerations of PCNP. Section 7 analyzes its perfor-
mance. The related work is shown in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 makes a
conclusion.
2. The Motivation and Adversary Models70
2.1. Motivation
Frequent Internet security incidents have resulted in serious problems for
both the sender and the receiver of messages. Under this circumstance, the
sender needs to pay more attention to its privacy protection and manage to
minimize the information leakage (such as IP address, communication relation-75
ship, etc.) in the communication process; in addition, it promotes the recipient’s
need for receiving secure and reliable messages. Malicious traffic pursues the
sender’s responsibility, especially for the traffic that causes serious damage.
It is known from [23] and the TCP/IP network protocol stack that different
privacy information needs to be protected at different levels. Privacy protec-80
tion during network communication is usually to hide the user’s node iden-
tity/location information. These information are used for packet routing, so the
protection of these information belongs to the network level. Privacy protection
at the application layer can only protect such as application type, data informa-
tion and user activity patterns [24], and the application layer cannot verify the85
connection between the application layer part and the node identity/location.
The node identity/location information is hidden at the data link layer, i.e., a
MAC address, and there is little to do with the node identity/location informa-
tion in the cross-network routing message.
In order to hide node identity/location information, various anonymous com-90
munication networks have been proposed at the network level, but they only
have privacy protection capabilities and no accountability functions; technolo-
gies with accountability in network layer are rarely developed. The sender wants
his/her privacy to be protected, while the receiver wants to receive packets that
are authentic. In order to protect both senders and receivers, both privacy95
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protection and accountability are indispensable. With the rapid development
of network security techinques, how to balance privacy protection and account-
ability has become the most urgent issue.
2.2. Adversary Models
2.2.1. Credibility Consideration100
The credibility refers to the authenticity of a packet which can be accounted
to its sender. Anyone can trust a packet if it comes from a valid sender. In
addition, receivers need to be able to challenge the sender if they receive un-
wanted traffic (i.e., malicious traffic or ping flood). When receiving unwanted
traffic, the receiver needs to establish the relationship between the packet and105
its sender and take the corresponding actions to e.g. avoid the increased packet
loss. To establish such relations, a third-party agent has to be introduced. The
agent must not know the identity of the sender to be delegated but still can
verify the authenticity of the delegated information.
The Adversary Model A perpetrator can initiate malicious actions with-110
out exposing its identity, to break the relationship between itself and its issued
packets. Perpetrators may be in any locations in the network and can intercept,
read, or counterfeit unencrypted network data.
2.2.2. Privacy Consideration
Privacy preservation refers to the protection of the relationship between the115
packet and its sender, between the packet and its receiver, and between the
sender and the receiver. To achieve the privacy preservation, the identities of
senders and receivers must be hidden in the packet. Hiding identities of a sender
and a receiver can also simply hide the communication between them. However,
in the layer-2 broadcast domain, the sender or the receiver uses Medium Access120
Control (MAC) address to flood packets. The MAC may expose the privacy
of the sender or the receiver, which is beyond the scope of this article. The
identity of the sender or the receiver may also be leaked in higher layers, e.g.,
application layer, which is also beyond the scope of this paper.
The Adversary Model A perpetrator wants to break through privacy125
preservation to obtain the sender’s identity from packets, which can help them
find the sender’s behavior. It is assumed that perpetrators can observe the
packets transmitted over the network and also can compromise any network
entities except for the sender and the public key management facility.
3. An Overview of PCNP130
3.1. The Basic Design of PCNP
PCNP is designed to provide the credibility of packets, while keeping the
privacy preserved for packet senders and receivers. To describe the principle
of the proposed PCNP, the key symbols used are shown in Table 1. In the
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proposed PCNP, a temporary identity called AmID is introduced for anonymous135
communication between the CVAs of the sender and the receiver. The AmID
is used to reduce the risk of leaking sender’s identity by the CVA, which will be
detailed in Section 4. In order to ensure the packet to be delegated is credible,
we need to redesign the packet formation, which is described in Section 3.1.2.
Table 1: The Symbols Used in The PCNP Description.
Symbols Description
SKS ,SKD,SKV Symmetric keys shared by CVA and PKM, CVA and
delegated host, CVA and routers, respectively
ESK Encrypted with symmetric key SK
EPKM ,EC ,ES Encrypted with public key of PKM/client/server
seedS Used to search symmetric key or identity of sender
SerID The service identity in packet header, like port num-
ber
Fp(D) The fingerprint of data D (i.e., packet, ID)
H(D) The hash of data D
Certificate The certification that server authorizes CVA to reg-
ister service to name resolution server
M Encrypted Certificate with the public key of PKM
C The collection of AmID sent to CVA by receiver
SIGS(P ) The signature of packet P signed by its source
Name The name of a service
Exp The symbol of deadline
140
3.1.1. Packet Address Format
The address format proposed in PCNP consists of two logical pieces: a Net-
work IDentity (NID) identifies a network, which is used to forward packets to
the destination network, and a Host IDentity (HID) identifies a host in the des-
tination network. The complete address format can be expressed as NID:HID.145
Each host contains two types of HID : one is Real IDentity (RID), which is gen-
erated by using the public key that cannot be tampered and repudiated; the
other is Anonymous IDentity (AmID) which is generated by using RID, MAC,
random number and timestamp. AmID is used between CVA and packet sender
or receiver (more details will be given in Section 4). RID is long-term effective,150
while AmID is temporary which is used only once.
NID:RID is a traditional address in a sense, identifying a host, which is
globally unique and routable. However, NID:AmID is a temporary identity,
but in the same format of NID:RID. To prevent the conflicts with the AmID
generated by the other hosts in the same network domain, AmID should be155
registered with the Public Key Manager (PKM) for validity check. This check
has to guarantee: 1) AmID is generated by the packet sender; 2) AmID is
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|        Source Verify and Receive Identity        |
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|      Destination Verify and Receive Identity    |
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
~                                                                        ~
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|                             Verification                         |
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 1: The Packet Format in PCNP.
not being occupied. As a temporary identity, AmID has a life-time from the
registration to the end of its usage. If its life-time is over, or it has been used,
AmID will be removed from the AmID Cache (AC).160
As a host may contact multiple hosts for a certain period of time or maintain
multiple sessions with another host, it needs to generate multiple AmIDs for
privacy preservation. A network-layer protocol needs to implement an AC to
save all AmIDs currently registered. When receiving an Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) packet, the host checks if the HID is RID first. If it is, the165
host responds with its MAC address. Otherwise, the host searches the AC. If
the AC contains the HID, the host will return its MAC address; otherwise it
ignores the ARP.
3.1.2. Packet Format
To hide the identities of sender and receiver, PCNP replaces the source170
address, in traditional packet header, with the Verify and Receive Identity (VRI)
of source and replaces the destination address with destination VRI, as shown
in Figure 1. The source VRI is used to verify the authenticity of packets,
and the destination VRI is used to forward the packet to its receiver. Rather
than identifying the sender and the receiver, the source VRI identifies the CVA175
who vouches for the packets, and the destination VRI identifies the CVA who
delegates the received packets. If the communicators are not anonymous, the
VRIs are filled with the NID:RID of the sender and the receiver. A Verification
field (Ver) is introduced for two roles: one is used to verify the authenticity
of packets, and the other is used to challenge the packet sender [25]. The Ver180
consists of seedS and the signed fingerprint of payload SIGS(Fp(P )). The
seedS is encrypted with ExpS by the public key of PKM which is shared by
sender and PKM. The seedS is used to ensure the validity of the packet, and
the SIGS(Fp(P )) is mainly used to authenticate the identity of the sender of
the packet.185
[EPKM (seedS , ExpS), SIGS(Fp(P ))] (1)
seedS , which is refreshed periodically, is a secret token generated by the sender.
If a perpetrator generates a public key conflicting with that of an existing host,
the packets sent by the perpetrator will be failed for verification, as the perpe-
trator knows nothing about the seedS .
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Figure 2: An Overview of PCNP.
Figure 3: The sending process: (1) Sender sends Brief to CVAS; (2) CVAS verifies the
authenticity of the Brief ; (3) Sender sends packet; (4) Router verifies the authenticity of the
packet; (5) Router forwards the packet.
3.1.3. Communication190
The overview of PCNP is shown in Figure 2. The Sender’s CVA (CVAS)
and the Receiver’s CVA (CVAR) are chosen by the sender and the receiver,
respectively, which are used to hide their identities. PKM is the facility used
to manage public keys and provide authentication, which prevents host from
generating public keys randomly. To describe the PCNP clearly, the complete195
communication process is divided into three parts: sending process, receiving
process, and accountability process.
(1) Sending process.
As shown in Figure 3, to keep the credibility of a packet while hiding the
sender’s identity, CVAS is introduced to establish the relationship between200
packet and its sender. Before sending a packet P, the sender will anonymously
send a Brief, which is a packet carrying the summary of P, to the CVAS with
AmID. For the authenticity of Brief, CVAS needs to verify its authenticity from
PKM. At the same time, the sender sends out P. Due to the lack of sender’s
identity, the routers on the forwarding path will challenge the credibility of P.205
To do this, routers can send Verify, which is the packet used for verifying the au-
thenticity of P, to the CVAS which caches the summary of P (more details will
be provided in Section 4). If every packet of a stream gets verified, the forward-
ing performance will be seriously affected (i.e., the speed of packet transition
will be slowed down, and network congestion may be produced). Therefore, a210
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Figure 4: The receiving process: (1) Receiver sends a Publish to CVAR; (2) CVAR verifies
the authenticity of Publish; (3) Router forwards a packet to CVAR; (4) CVAR forwards the
packet to receiver after being processed.
local whitelist is introduced to cache the summary of packet that has passed
the verification.
(2) Receiving process.
A receiver can be a server which provides certain services (e.g., website and
cloud computing) or a host which receives a response. As shown in Figure 4,215
if it is a server, it will anonymously send Publish to CVAR with AmID to hide
its identity (more details are shown in Section 4). A Publish is a packet used to
authorize its CVAR to register a service to Domain Name System (DNS) with
the NID:RID of CVAR. Due to the lack of the receiver’s identity in the Publish,
CVAR needs to verify the authenticity of Publish. When requesting a service220
of receiver, the sender issues a request P to CVAR. CVAR forwards P to the
receiver with AmID. If it is the host to receive a response, CVAR receives the
response packet and forwards it to the receiver with AmID.
(3) Accountability process.
As shown in Figure 5, when receiving unwanted traffic (e.g., malicious traf-225
fic), the receiver sends Shutoff to decrease the resulting negative impact. The
Shutoff is the packet used to report to CVAS and block unwanted traffic quickly.
During the forwarding of Shutoff, routers can verify it as a standard packet as
mentioned in the Sending process. When CVAS receives a Shutoff, it finds the
related records and stops providing the verification of related packets, and fi-230
nally forwards the encrypted Shutoff to the sender. The sender should then stop
sending the traffic. A malicious host may ignore the Shutoff and the negative
impact can continue spreading. But the CVAS can fail the packet verification
and stops the traffic. To achieve better performance, the router introduces a
Blacklist, which caches the blocked packets.235
The proposed PCNP has four advantages. First, CVA protects the privacy
of senders, although CVAS is not clear to whom it delegates. Second, it pro-
tects the privacy of receivers, although CVAR is not clear of those delegated
receivers. Third, PCNP hides the communication relationship between sender
and receiver. Finally, it provides a credible communication while protecting the240
privacy of senders and receivers.
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Figure 5: The accountability process: (1) Receiver sends the Brief of Shutoff ; (2) Receiver
sends Shutoff ; (3) Router verifies the Shutoff ; (4) Router forwards the Shutoff to CVAS; (5)
CVAS forwards the processed Shutoff to sender.
4. The Details of PCNP
This section shows the detailed design of PCNP, where the design of anonymity
method, key management and other mechanisms are inspired by [26] in Chapter
15. It should be noted that all packets in PCNP contain Ver. For the sake of245
the clarity of illustration, the Ver is not included in describing a packet in this
section.
4.1. Communication and Verification Agent (CVA)
CVA plays a key role in the proposed PCNP. It proves the relationship
between packet and its sender/its receiver.250
4.1.1. The relationship between packet and its sender
To prove the relationship between the packet P and its sender, the sender
issues a Brief with NID:AmID to CVAS before sending P, which can be used
as digital certificate if legal intervention is required. The Brief contains the
5-tuple (i.e., source VRI, source SerID, protocol type, destination SerID, and255
destination VRI) and the fingerprint of P. SerID is selected from the SerID
collection, which is negotiated between CVA and the delegated host. To pre-
vent the anonymity scope of senders from being narrowed by others using the
link between 5-tuple and NID, we suggest that the payload of Brief should be
encrypted using symmetric key SKD. SKD is negotiated after the sender es-260
tablishes a connection with CVAS using AmID, as shown in Figure 6. When
receiving a Brief, CVAS needs to verify its authenticity from PKM (more details
are given in Section 4.2.1).
The sender sending Brief to CVAS can be expressed as:
Brief(ESKD (5− tuple, SIGS(Fp(P )), AmID)) (2)
4.1.2. Forward packets to the receiver265
The basic function of CVAR is to forward packets to receivers. As mentioned
in Section 3, receivers can be divided into two types: a server (i.e., web sites,
cloud computing), from which a sender requests a service; and a host, who
receives responses. If the receiver is a server, it authorizes CVAR to register its
service, which will be detailed in the Section (1) below.270
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(1) Publish service.
Publish The receiver sends Publish to authorize CVAR to register ser-
vices with the NID:RID of CVAR. Publish is a packet for authorizing, which
contains the service name, encrypted authorization Certificate, and a collection
of AmIDs. The Certificate is the credential that a server authorizes CVAR,275
which has been uploaded and confirmed by PKM. The Certificate contains the
service name, the identity of server, and the identity of CVAR to be authorized.
For the credibility of Publish, the service name, encrypted Certificate, and the
hash of collection of AmIDs will be sent to PKM for verification (more details
will be available in Section 4.2). The AmID collection is used for CVAR to280
forward requests with NID to the server as the destination VRI. Each service
has an AmID collection, and each AmID is assigned to a request. The payload
of Publish is encrypted with SD which is shared between CVAR and server.
The receiver authorizing CVAR to register service can be shown as:
Publish(ESKD (Name,M,C)) (3)
Update The size of AmID collection is limited and needs to be updated285
periodically. This paper proposes two options for updating: Interval-based up-
date and Quantity-based update.
Interval-based Update. Considering that some servers may have less traffic,
AmID collection may have not been used up in updating interval, interval. As
the AmID runs the risk of being leaked, and the sender loses its anonymity290
beyond the update interval, the AmID collection is still updated periodically.
Therefore, each server has a Timer. When there is time T left before the inter-
val ends (interval < life-time), the server starts to generate a new AmID and
updates them to CVAR when time τ (τ < T ) is left. The update is anonymous,
so it needs to be verified similar to the Publish.295
Quantity-based Update. Considering that some servers may have amounts of
traffic, and the AmIDs in life-time may be used up, PCNP provides a quantity-
based update mechanism. Each server sets a Counter to record the number of
remaining AmIDs. When Counter reaches the threshold θ (θ ≥ 1), the server
updates AmIDs to CVAR. The update will be handled in the same way as the300
Interval-based scheme.
(2) Forward packet.
The destination VRI in the packet is a CVAR’s NID:RID, which is not the
final receiver. CVAR should forward packets to its final receiver.
To avoid observer’s tracking, CVAR establishes a new connection with dele-305
gated receiver using a new AmID. If the packet is a request to a server, AmID is
selected from the AmID collection; if the packet is a response, AmID comes from
a Brief record. Then, CVAR and the delegated receiver negotiate a symmetric
key SKD. The CVAR re-encapsulates the packet using SKD.
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Figure 6: The process of Brief.
4.2. Credibility Measures310
Credibility measures are necessary in PCNP, mainly including two aspects:
1) Verification and 2) Accountability.
4.2.1. Verification
It is dangerous that a CVA knows nothing about to whom it delegates. For
credibility, a packet needs to be verified for its authenticity. This section makes315
a summary of the verification in PCNP as follows.
(1) CVA verifies the authenticity of Brief.
CVA verifies the authenticity of Brief. The foundation for providing the
verification of packet is the authenticity of Brief in CVAS. Specifically, the
CVAS establishes a connection with PKM and negotiates a symmetric key SKS .320
The CVAS encrypts the Ver of Brief with SKS and encapsulates it into Verify.
Then, the CVAS sends the Verify to PKM for verification. The PKM mainly
verifies two things: 1) check the Ver of Verify for its authenticity; 2) check the
Ver of Brief contained in Verify. For the check, it mainly contains that the seed
in Ver has been registered in PKM, the signature is genuine, and the fingerprint325
matches the fingerprint re-calculated by CVAS. The details are shown in Figure
6.
(2) CVA verifies the credibility of Publish.
The foundation for providing the credible authorization of a service is the
authenticity of Publish received by CVAR. Specifically, the CVAR establishes330
a connection with PKM and negotiates a symmetric key SKS . The CVAR
encrypts the Ver of Publish with SKS and encapsulates it into Verify. Then,
the CVAR sends the Verify to PKM for verification. The PKM mainly verifies
four things: 1) the Verify is valid; 2) the Ver of Publish is valid; 3) the Certificate
11
Figure 7: The verification of Publish.
matches with a registered one in PKM; and 4) the H(C) matches with the hash335
of the registered AmID collection. If all the conditions are satisfied, PKM
returns the fingerprint of Publish signed by PKM, and CVAR registers the
service to DNS. The details are shown in Figure 7.
(3) Routers verify authenticity of packet to be forwarded.
When receiving a packet, routers check their Whitelist in which the packets340
have been verified. If it is not in, routers search the Blacklist in which the
packet is blocked. If it is blocked, routers drop the packet directly. When the
packet is neither in Whitelist nor in Blacklist, routers send Verify to verify the
packet authenticity (see Figure.8). If the packet is credible, routers continue
forwarding it.345
4.2.2. Accountability
A receiver should only account for unwanted packets for any damages.
(1) Shutoff.
Shutoff is used to block malicious traffic of the sender. However, the ma-
licious sender may ignore the Shutoff. Therefore, we use routers and CVA to350
play a supporting role. Once receiving a Shutoff, routers search the information
carried in the Shutoff in the local Whitelist. If it is not in, routers put it in their
Blacklist; if it is in, routers confirm the Shutoff from the CVAR. If the Shutoff
is valid, it will be removed from Whitelist and added into Blacklist; otherwise
routers ignore the Shutoff. Once being found in Blacklist, the packet will be355
discarded.
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Figure 8: The verification of a packet.
Granularity The traditional way uses the 5-tuple in packet header to
form Flow Identity. The SerID is one component of 5-tuple in PCNP like port
number. When several senders use the same proxy, it is difficult to distinguish
those access to the same service on the same server for the 5-tuple, if they use360
the same source SerID, destination SerID and VRI. To provide finer-granularity
traffic accountability, CVA and sender (or receiver) negotiate SerID collection
with AmID. Different traffic will have different SerIDs: a sender can use a SerID
to a host, and it can also use a SerID to a session, even to a packet.
Credibility metrics In APIP, long-term fix and short-term fix are pro-365
posed [21], which lacks flexibility. Therefore, we propose new credibility metrics:
the Damage Degree (DD) ψ, the Historical Safety Assessment (HSA) Φ, and
Benign Ratio (BR). DD is calculated according to resource consumption, per-
formance influence, and data damage. HSA obeys a power function with a base
of mean value of historical Ψ, multiplied by a constant coefficient to make the370
value range between [0, 1], which represents the reputation of a node. BR is the
ratio of the benign packets δ and total volume of packets Σ. DD, HSA and BR
are typical metrics that can be used to evaluate sender reputation, and they are
the basis for determining the blocking time. The higher the DD and the lower
the HSA, the longer the blocking time by Shutoff is. When receiving unwanted375
traffic, the receiver determines the blocking time Γ for the sender to fix the
problems, according to the credibility metrics which are computed in PKM as
follows.
Γ = (ψ + (
δ
Σ
· Φ)−1) · Ω, µ < δ
Σ
· Φ < 1, 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 10 (4)
where Ω is the time-unit of blocking time. We evaluate the sender’s reputation
by calculating δΣ · Φ and set a threshold µ as a criterion for evaluating sender380
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reputation. When the reputation is lower than µ, all traffic of the sender is
permanently blocked; otherwise, the blocking time is calculated according to
the above formula.
Security NIC Perpetrators usually do not admit their malicious actions
and even ignore Shutoff. We therefore introduce a Security Network Interface385
Card (S-NIC). S-NIC is assembled on the host using hot swapping and burned
asymmetric key and identity. Host cannot modify them via Operating System
(OS) and malicious programs. S-NIC’s built-in cache space is used to cache
fingerprint of packets sent through it. S-NIC checks the Ver of the packet sent
out through this S-NIC. Once receiving a Shutoff, OS stops the application, and390
S-NIC filters related packets.
5. Security Analysis
5.1. Bootstrap Trust
Although PCNP uses public key to generate self-certifying identity (RID),
additional supports are required for credibility. Brief contains the sender’s395
signature to prove its authentication and encrypted with symmetric key for the
privacy of senders. Except for those mentioned in Brief, Publish carries an
encrypted credential for authorizing CVA to register service. Verify includes
two categories to keep the credibility: first, CVA verifies the authenticity of
delegated information; second, anyone can verify the authenticity of packets400
from the CVA. The payload of Verify is also encrypted with symmetric key.
Shutoff contains Ver. If there are any doubts about a Shutoff, the sender can
verify it from CVA, who caches the Brief of the Shutoff.
5.2. Attack on Credibility
5.2.1. Spoofing405
Perpetrators have two possible spoofing packets. First, intercepting a packet
and reinjecting it into network for replay attack. Records in Whitelist have a
lifetime. If they are outdated when replay attack happens, the verification will
fail; if they are within time limits, the receiver sends Shutoff. Second, perpetra-
tors generate public key and identity randomly. If the public key generated has410
not been registered in PKM, the verification of the Brief signed by this public
key will be failed, and the CVAS will not store its record. If the public key
has registered in PKM, the Brief verification will be failure as the perpetrator
knows nothing about the secret token.
5.2.2. Risk of CVA415
If perpetrators send Brief with false HID, the verification will be failed as
the seed cannot be known by perpetrators. Perpetrators can also send a large
amount of false Brief or false packets causing routers to send a lot of Verify
which may lead DoS attack and make CVA lose service capability. Although
CVA has higher reputation, it still can be compromised. A compromised CVA420
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may fail a valid packet or authenticate an invalid packet. In this case, it is worth
noting that the CVA can be replaced freely when sender or receiver detects these
malicious actions, because the correspondence between CVA and server is not
fixed.
5.3. Attack on Privacy425
The goal of privacy preservation is to protect the relationship between packet
and its sender (or receiver), the communication relationship between sender and
receiver. In APIP [21] and APNA [22], the privacy can be available as long as
the agent is compromised. While in PCNP, all records in CVA, which is the
agent containing only AmID, do not contain sender’s or receiver’s identity, which430
means the privacy mentioned above cannot be leaked. Though AmID can be
obtained via CVA, it is not sure to whom AmID belongs.
6. Deployment and Compatibility
6.1. Deployment
When deploying PCNP, a highly trusted third-party needs to be selected as a435
CVA (e.g., ISP, which is short for Internet Service Provider, or a company with
high reputation). In current network, Network Address Translation (NAT) and
Border Router (BR) enjoy good reputations. When receiving a packet, CVA
replaces the destination address with AmID, which is similar to NAT. When a
packet leaves its source domain, NAT can provide verification and accountability440
for the packet through it. In the Autonomous System (AS), the BR, which is the
AS gateway for packet transition, can record all packets through it and prove
the authenticity of packets within it. That is to say, both NAT and BR can be
used as CVAs.
6.2. Compatibility445
If PCNP is introduced into the widely used TCP/IP network, the works
below are needed: deploy CVAs; add additional functions to PKI; use source
and destination addresses in packet header as source and destination VRI; and
fill Ver in optional field of IP header. It is worth noting that the NAT or BR
can be configured as the CVA. In order to ensure IP addresses are credible and450
comply with PCNP, PKI needs to add seed, authorization credential and veri-
fication function. In a Local Area Network (LAN), many IP addresses with the
same NID must be reserved as NID:AmID. ISPs can dynamically allocate IP
addresses as NID:AmID by DHCP. IPv6 is considered as the next generation
Internet protocol and possesses a lot of similarity with IPv4. IPv6 can be tuned455
in the same way as IPv4 when PCNP is introduced. In addition, some well-
known projects on future Internet architecture, e.g., MobilityFirst [27] and HIP
[28], have investigated the way of adapting to the changes of the future traffic
types. MobilityFirst and HIP introduced the flat naming scheme. MobilityFirst
separates host identity from location with Globally Unique Identifier (GUID).460
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PCNP only concerns how to hide GUID without worrying about Network Ad-
dress (NA). In order to use the proposed PCNP in MobilityFirst, we need to
deploy CVAs, replace source and destination GUIDs in packet with the GUIDs
of CVAS and CVAR, and add Verification in Service Header Extensions. As
HIP packet header is IPv6 header, it can follow IPv6 adjustment method to use465
PCNP.
7. Evaluation and Performance Analysis
To evaluate the proposed PCNP, this paper uses IP as overlay. The sender,
router and receiver are implemented with C++ for faster packet forwarding; the
CVA and PKM are implemented with JAVA for multi-platform compatibility.470
The experiment is made on two physical computers: the OS is Ubuntu 16.04
whose core is 4.4.0-83-generic, and CPU is i5-3470T @ 2.9GHz *4. The sender,
router and receiver run as processes on one computer, while CVA and PKM run
as processes on the other one.
7.1. Round-Trip Time (RTT)475
RTT is the time from sending a request by the sender to receiving its re-
sponse. It directly affects how users feel the network they used subject to a
given network protocol and is one of the most important indicators for evalu-
ating the feasibility of a network protocol. In this experiment, we change two
variables: the number of routers on the forwarding path and the number of480
routers verifying the authenticity of packet. Figure 9 depicts the RTT between
sender and receiver, whose x-axis represents the number of routers and the y-
axis denotes the RTT. For each additional router forwarding on the routing path
without verification as what the Internet Protocol (IP) does, one link transmis-
sion time Tt and one router processing time Tp are required. The total time485
is Tsum =
∑I
i=h (N · (T it + T ip) + T ip),where I is the total number of packets.
From this figure, we can see that the RTT is increasing with the increase in the
number of routers on the forwarding path or the number of routers providing
verification. It takes longer time for RTT to go through routers with verification
than routers only forwarding packets. But the time used for verification does490
not obviously increase with the number of by-passing routers. The ith packet
verification time required for the router is ti.The total time with verification
is Tsum =
∑I
i=h (N · (T it + T ip + ti) + T ip). However, due to the introduction of
whitelist and the blacklist, only the first one packet needs to be authenticated
by the routers of the path, and the subsequent packets only need to access495
the blacklist and whitelist of the routers. This time for accessing the blacklist
and the whitelist is much shorter than the packet verification time, and then
can be ignored. Thus, the total time with verification also can be expressed as
Tsum =
∑I
i=h (N · (T it + T ip) + T ip). Therefore, the RTT is acceptable in reality
as the value is millisecond.500
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Figure 9: The RTT of a communication between the sender and the receiver
7.2. AmID Collection
AmID Collection is an important part of PCNP privacy protection. The
frequency of AmID Collection update and the size of AmID Collection not only
affect PCNP’s ability to protect privacy but also affect network congestion.
The relationship among the size of AmID collection, lifecycle and traffic needs505
to be taken into consideration. We use RSA1024 and SHA256 to generate
HID. Assuming that the traffic volume changes between 10 and 1,000,000, and
the lifecycle varies from 12 to 72 hours. Figure 10 depicts the space usage of
CVAR, whose x-axis is the access traffic volume that represents the volume of
received packets by the receiver, the y-axis denotes the lifecycle, and the z-axis510
represents the space usage. From Figure 10, we can see when traffic is constant,
AmID collection size is linearly positive correlated to lifecycle. When lifecycle
is constant, the size of AmID collection is linearly positive correlated to traffic.
When the access traffic volume is constant, the longer the AmID Collection515
update cycle is, the more AmIDs needs to be included in the AmID Collection
in order to ensure normal service delivery, but the longer update cycle also
increases the risk of AmID being leaked. When the AmID Collection has a
fixed capacity, the larger the volume of access is, the smaller the update cycle is
required by the AmID Collection, but the risk of AmID being leaked is reduced.520
When the AmID Collection update period is fixed, the AmID Collection update
cycle will be shortened in order to maintain normal service capabilities.
7.3. Blocking Time
Blocking unwanted traffic is a specific punishment for PCNP to account for
malicious users, and is a direct indicator that affects the credibility of PCNP.525
DD is divided into 10 grades according to the degree of damage. BR changes
between 0.9 and 1, and µ=0.9. HSA varies between 0 and 1. The blocking time
is the period the traffic to be blocked. The Growth Unit of DD, HSA and BR
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are set to be 1, 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. Figure 11 depicts the Block Time,
whose x-axis represents the growth unit of DD, HSA and BR, and the y-axis530
denotes the blocking time. From this figure, we can see that DD has a linear
positive correlation with blocking time. For the HSA, the lower the value, the
greater the impact on blocking time. The higher DD and HSA, the blocking
time is less affected by the BR.
The effect of the HSA on the blocking time follows a power function with535
a parameter of -1, which means the lower a sender’s historical reputation is,
the more drastic effect will be exerted on the blocking time. Because the low
historical reputation indicates that the sender is more frequently producing
network anomalies, it will always be the object of vigilance, and the punishment
should be heavier. If the history reputation is high (there is rarely a network540
anomaly in history), the influence of HSA on blocking time is lighter, while DD
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plays a decisive role in the traffic accountability. The larger the DD is, the more
serious the damage will be caused by the unwanted traffic, and therefore more
timely measures to stop the loss are needed.
8. Related Work545
As the existing studies may consider credibility or privacy preservation, for
explicit illustration, we separate this section into two parts: Credibility and
Privacy.
8.1. Credibility
Although observers can tell the identities of senders and receivers of a packet550
in TCP/IP network, IP address is not credible. In order to solve IP address
credibility issues, S-BGP [29] added address attestation field and introduced
two PKI infrastructures to bind public key with IP address and AS. To achieve
more credibility, AIP [30] made public key as host identity for the first time.
However, TCP/IP and AIP had no online accountable measures and cannot555
protect privacy. APIP balanced accountability and privacy in [21] by introduc-
ing accountability agent. APNA proposed a privacy preservation scheme with
ISP assistance in [22]. It introduced temporary EphIDs to support credibility
and privacy preservation. In APIP and APNA, their credibility is mainly based
on the delegate or ISP. In [31], the privacy preservation trust management sys-560
tem can only detect and control unwanted traffic without holding any measures
accountable.
8.2. Privacy
Mix is an anonymous approach proposed by Chaum in [15]. The essence of
Mix is a middleman mixing multiuser messages, confusing the observer’s sight.565
Onion routing [16] algorithm uses source routing to randomly select three onion
routers to form a transmission path and encrypt data for many times to ef-
fectively hide sender and receiver. However, the receiver cannot account for
malicious traffic. AHP asks for ISP’s assistance and uses NAT to map IP ad-
dress to hide IP and stick IP to achieve privacy in [32]. APIP [21] separated570
the accountability role from the source address. APNA [22] used Management
Service (MS) to issue an EphID, which is used to replace sender address. How-
ever, those studies do not provide destination host privacy preservation, and
the third-party runs the risk of leaking sender’s privacy. Based on AIP and
APIP, [33] proposed a new architecture for trusted anonymous use of services575
in distributed computing networks.
9. Conclusion
This paper has tackled the latest research on credibility and privacy preser-
vation in network layer and proposed PCNP. PCNP has introduced CVA to hide
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communicator’s identity and performed trusted communication under the con-580
dition that communicators are anonymous to CVA. The security, deployment
and compatibility of the proposed PCNP has been analyzed. The performance
of PCNP has been validated by extensive experiments. The results have demon-
strated the feasibility of the proposed PCNP.
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